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Premium Rate Determination in the Federal Crop
Insurance Program: What Do Averages  Have to
Say About Risk?
Barry K. Goodwin
This  article reviews actuarial  procedures  used to  calculate  premium rates  in
the federal crop insurance program.  Average  yields are used as an important
indicator of risk under current rating  practices.  The strength and  validity of
this relationship  is  examined using  historical yield  data drawn  from a  large
sample of Kansas farms. The results indicate  that assumed relationships  be-
tween  average  yields  and  yield variation  are  tenuous  and  imply that rating
procedures that rely on average yields may induce adverse selection.
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Introduction
The  U.S.  federal  crop  insurance  program  plays  an important  role  in policy  efforts  to
provide farmers protection against catastrophic  yield shortfalls.  Federally regulated crop
insurance programs  have been in existence  since  the  1930s, although participation gen-
erally has  been quite  limited.' The  current program has been criticized  because of high
costs and poor actuarial performance. Government outlays for the federal crop insurance
program  exceeded  $9.2  billion between  1980  and  1990.  Over  this period,  indemnity
outlays totaled over $7.1  billion while premiums collected from producers were only $3.8
billion. This corresponds  to net losses (excluding  administrative  costs) that exceed  $3.3
billion and implies that, on average,  farmers received  $1.88  in indemnities for each  $1
of premiums  paid (i.e.,  a loss ratio of 1.88).
Many critics of the federal crop insurance program point to adverse selection and moral
hazard as reasons  for the poor actuarial performance of the program. Both problems are
intimately related  to the Federal  Crop Insurance  Corporation's  (FCIC) actuarial  deter-
mination  of insurance premium  rates. Adverse  selection occurs if premiums do not ac-
curately reflect an individual farmer's likelihood of loss. Because producers  are better able
to ascertain their likelihood of suffering losses than are insurers, adverse selection remains
a serious problem affecting the actuarial soundness of the crop insurance program. Moral
hazard  refers  to the problem  that occurs  if producers  alter their behavior after buying
insurance  in order to increase their likelihood  of collecting  indemnities.  If rates do not
adjust as loss risk rises, the actuarial performance of the industry will be threatened.
In  any  insurance  market,  adverse  selection  problems  can  be  traced  directly  to  the
actuarial practices that are used to calculate insurance premium rates. If individual risks
cannot be identified and premiums are based upon some aggregate risk measure,  then low
risk producers  will  be overcharged  for their insurance  and  high risk producers  will be
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undercharged.  As a result, high risk producers are more likely to insure and the riskiness
of the pool tends to be higher than would be the case if premiums were actuarially fair.2
The poor actuarial  performance  of the federal  crop  insurance  program has led critics
to recommend  that premium  rates  be raised to lower losses.  For example,  a  1992 U.S.
General Accounting Office (USGAO) report noted that "... our periodic financial audits
...  confirm that FCIC has not charged high enough premiums to achieve actuarial sound-
ness" (p. 25). However,  recent research (Goodwin) has demonstrated that high risk pro-
ducers  are less  responsive  to premium  increases  than  low risk producers.  In this light,
efforts  to  lower  losses  through  across-the-board  premium  rate  increases  may  actually
worsen the actuarial performance of the program as high risk producers comprise an ever-
increasing proportion of a smaller insurance pool. A superior solution would require that
rate-setting techniques be altered to alleviate adverse selection by charging premium rates
that better reflect individual producers'  risks.
This study considers the role of adverse selection in current premium-setting techniques
that are used by the FCIC to rate the federal  crop insurance  program.  The federal  crop
insurance  program  is  described  briefly in  the following  section.  In the next section,  a
description  is provided  of the current actuarial practices  used by the FCIC to calculate
insurance premium rates. Possible shortcomings  of these practices are noted.  The fourth
and  fifth  sections  consider  an empirical  analysis of loss risks  and  average yields  using
farm-level data for a large sample of Kansas crop farms observed between  1981  and 1991.
The final section  contains  a brief summary  of the study and some  concluding  remarks
are offered.
The Federal Crop Insurance Program
Under current  federal crop  insurance  programs for most field crops, producers  are able
to select from  three guaranteed  yield levels  (50%,  65%, or  75% of their insurable yield)
and from  a range of guaranteed  price  levels.  Price  election levels  are  determined from
FCIC forecasts of expected prices.  The  top price election  level  is set at 90-100% of the
expected market price. Prior to  1994, three price  election levels were available for most
crops.  Recent  program  changes now  allow  price  elections between  30-100% of the top
price  election  level.  If the producer's  yield  falls below  the  elected  coverage  level,  the
producer receives an indemnity payment equal to the product of the elected price coverage
and the yield shortfall.  This yield shortfall is determined by the amount that actual yields
fall short of the farm's insured yield.
The per-acre premium  is determined by the product  of the price  guarantee,  the yield
guarantee,  the FCIC's estimate of the farm's yield, and the premium rate. Under the 1980
Act, subsidies were introduced to encourage participation in the program. There is a 30%
subsidy on the  50% and 65% yield guarantees.  The subsidy for the 75% yield guarantee
is equal to the dollar amount of the 65% guarantee level. Federal crop insurance is currently
available for about 40 different crops.
FCIC's Actuarial Determination of Insurance Premium Rates3
Many believe that adverse selection is the most significant problem affecting the actuarial
soundness of the federal crop insurance program (Miranda).  The presence (or absence) of
adverse selection is directly related to the extent to which insurance premiums accurately
reflect the likelihood of losses.  The FCIC adopts a number of assumptions when  deter-
mining insurance premium rates that may induce adverse selection in the insurance pool.
The most fundamental (though not necessarily most serious) shortcoming associated with
rate-setting  practices  is that rates  are  determined  for a relatively  large geographic  area
(i.e., the county in which the farm is located).  Thus, all individuals with the same average
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yield in a county pay an identical premium  rate (dollars per hundred dollars of liability)
for the same crop  and practice type.
Prior to 1985, insurance  levels (i.e., the liability levels calculated from insurable yields)
were determined using average yields (for both insurance purchasers  and nonpurchasers)
in the farm's geographic  area. This resulted in adverse selection since farms with loss risks
above the area averages comprised an ever-increasing  proportion of the insured pool.  In
an attempt to address the problem of adverse selection, the FCIC revised its determination
of insurable yields in 1985  by instead examining the actual production history (APH) of
the farm when determining insurable yield levels.
Under  the  APH  approach,  insurable yields  and premium  rates  are  calculated by ex-
amining the average yield of the farm's preceding  10 years of production data. Beginning
with the  1994 crop year,  producers could qualify for APH yields with only four years of
production data,  although up to  10  years of data are used if available.  If less than four
years of actual data are available,  weighted Agricultural  Stabilization  and Conservation
Service  (ASCS) program yields  are used in place  of the missing yields.  Farms purchase
coverage to insure a given proportion (50%, 65%, or 75%) of their average yields.  As will
be developed  in detail below,  direct use of average yields without consideration of yield
variation may poorly represent the likelihood of collecting  indemnity payments.
In the actuarial determination  of county-level  rates, the FCIC examines a number of
factors.  The first step in rate determination involves an examination  of the 20-year loss
history of a given county. Loss cost ratios for the preceding 20 years are examined.4 The
four largest loss cost  ratios are capped at the level of the fifth largest ratio. The  capped
data are grouped  into  a pool  (representing a catastrophic  loading  factor) which  later is
spread over the entire state. The capped loss cost ratios plus the  16 lowest loss cost ratios
are averaged to obtain a county loss cost ratio which then is used to construct an actuarially
sound rate for each  county.  The loss cost ratios  then are smoothed across county lines.
This  smoothing  is  undertaken  to  soften  large  differences  in  the cost  of insurance  for
neighboring  farms.  The catastrophic loading factor  next is spread across the entire state
and rates  are  adjusted accordingly.  The resulting  rates  are set for a given crop practice
(e.g.,  irrigated versus dryland production)  at the county level.  The  smoothing and loss-
spreading practices  may induce adverse selection into rates  since high loss-risk counties
likely will see lower rates while low loss-risk counties will see higher rates.
Next, rates are adjusted according to county average yields, as represented by yield data
calculated  by  the National  Agricultural  Statistics  Service  (NASS). 5 Rates  are  adjusted
inversely  with  county  average  yields.  Thus,  counties  with  high  average  yields  realize
premium rate discounts relative  to counties with low average  yields, regardless of actual
losses or yield variation.
County rates  are spread  over a range of average yields using a proportional spanning
procedure.  Under the proportional  spanning procedure,  nine discrete risk categories  are
defined and rates in each category are inversely adjusted according to the farm's average
yield. In this way, farms with higher average yields have lower premium rates. In addition,
because  of the  proportional  nature  of the discounting,  as average  yields  increase,  the
premium falls at an increasing rate.
A final  constraint faced  by the FCIC in its  actuarial determination  of premiums  is a
restriction imposed  by legislation  that limits  the amount that a rate can  increase from
year to year. In most cases, premium rates may not increase by more than 20% from one
year to the next.  This constraint  may bring about a reduction in the flexibility afforded
to the FCIC for eliminating adverse selection through premium rate adjustments.
Average Yields  and Yield Variation: What Do Averages  Say  About Risk?
An important assumption implicit in the FCIC's actuarial practices involves the assumed
relationship between average yields and the likelihood of loss. Botts and Boles noted that
the FCIC's  use of average  yields assumes  a constant relationship  between  mean yields
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and the variance  of yields. Specifically,  they noted that the standard deviation of yields
is assumed to be one-fourth of the mean of yields (i.e.,  that the coefficient of variation is
25%).
Skees and Reed used yield  averages and standard deviations for four relatively small
samples collected  from corn and soybean farms in Kentucky and Illinois to evaluate the
relationship between yield averages and standard deviations.6 Their results indicated that
no strong relationship existed between the mean yield and the standard deviation of yields.
They also evaluated the relationship between the coefficient of variation (the ratio of the
standard deviation  to the average)  and the mean of yields. Their results  indicated  that
the coefficient  of variation  of yields tended to fall as average yields rise, giving support
for rate-setting techniques that apply discounts as average yields rise.
A weakness associated with inferences drawn from such an analysis is the fact that the
estimated relationship between average yields and yield variation is of an aggregate  (av-
erage) nature.  Although Skees and Reed do not explicitly report their regression  results,
the lack of a significant  relationship between  average yields and the standard deviation
of yields suggests that considerable  variation in this relationship existed across the farms
in their sample. An important point to recognize is that the farms that purchase insurance
are  not likely to be  randomly drawn  from  this aggregated  sample.  That is,  finding  no
relationship between the mean and standard deviation of yields  in an  aggregate  sample
(or even  an imperfect  relationship)  suggests that the potential  exists  for a self-selected
subset of the sample to be at one extreme of this relationship. In particular, it is expected
that insurance  buyers  will tend  to have  a higher yield variance  relative  to their  mean
yields than those farms that do not insure.
The use of average yields as an indicator of loss risk may introduce adverse  selection
into the insurance pool if the relationship between average yields and relative yield vari-
ation is not strong. The important  factor determining loss risk is relative  yield variation
(i.e., variation relative to the mean). Consider the yield distributions illustrated in figure
1.7 The top panel of the figure  illustrates  the yield distribution  for a farm with a high
mean and a high relative variance  of yields. The bottom panel illustrates  a farm with a
low average yield and  a low relative yield variance. Assuming  that both farms choose
insurance coverage at the  75% yield election, indemnities are collected only when yields
fall below 75% of the mean. The likelihood of suffering a collectable loss is illustrated by
the shaded areas of each distribution. In this case, the farm with the higher average yield
is considerably more likely  to collect an indemnity payment  than is the farm with the
lower average yield. Further, when the farm with the higher average yield collects indem-
nities, the indemnity payments  will be considerably higher since  the indemnity is deter-
mined from a higher average yield.
In reality, considerable  variation likely exists in the relationship between average yields
and yield variation across different  farms. That is, if one examines this relationship for
a large  sample  of farms  using  regression  analysis and  finds  a relatively  low degree  of
explanatory power (i.e., a low R2), it is likely that there are some farms with yield distri-
butions similar to the one illustrated  in the first panel and others with distributions like
that given in the second panel. However, the important point to note is that farms of the
sort illustrated in the first panel  are much more likely to purchase  insurance. If rates are
determined using  average yields,  farms with high relative yield variation likely will  be
undercharged. Conversely, farms with relatively low relative yield variation will be over-
charged for insurance and thus will be less likely to buy coverage.
An Evaluation of Yield  Averages,  Yield  Variance, and Empirical Premium Rates
In a manner similar to that undertaken by Skees and Reed, the relationship between the
mean of yields and the standard deviation of yields was evaluated using data drawn from
2,247 farms in the Kansas Farm Management Databank. Ten years of yield data (1981-
90) were used to calculate yield averages and standard deviations.8 Table 1 illustrates the
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Figure  1.  Effect  of relative yield variability on likelihood of collecting  indemnities
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Table 1.  Relationship Between Means and Standard  Deviations of Yields (or  = i,  +  1uti) for Kansas
Farms (1981-90)
F-Test of
Ho:  ,o  = 0,  Average
Crop  _  io  /,  n  R2 , 1=.25  CV
Dryland Wheat  7.6868  .0809  864  .019  224.99*  31.5168
(.6790)*  (.0200)*  (.3361)
Irrigated  Wheat  12.6968  .0010  66  .001  10.13*  28.0701
(3.0817)*  (.0654)  (1.2416)
Dryland Corn  20.2925  .0834  139  .035  61.02*  32.0720
(3.3628)*  (.0377)*  (.7233)
Irrigated Corn  38.6819  -.1284  82  .066  437.67*  16.2294
(7.4046)*  (.0538)*  (1.0472)
Dryland Sorghum  14.4434  .0866  629  .068  314.98*  33.3429
(.8237)*  (.0129)*  (.4359)
Irrigated Sorghum  23.1458  -. 0352  52  .005  12.29*  21.9779
(6.8575)*  (.0716)  (1.5419)
Dryland Soybeans  5.9383  .1559  389  .146  521.49*  40.1726
(.4990)*  (.0192)*  (.5329)
Irrigated Soybeans  13.7560  -. 1235  39  .155  87.96*  17.5311
(2.3109)*  (.0481)*  (1.2455)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses in [fo and f,  columns are standard errors, and in Average CV column are standard
errors of the means.  An asterisk (*)  indicates  statistical significance at the .05 level.
estimated relationships between the standard deviation of yields and the average  yields.
In  contrast  to the  finding  of Skees  and  Reed,  in six  of the eight  cases,  a  statistically
significant  relationship between the average yield and the standard deviation of yields is
confirmed.  In three  of the five significant cases,  the results indicate that higher average
yields correspond to higher variation in yields.  An F-test of whether this relationship is
of the form noted by Botts and Boles to be implicit in the FCIC's rate-making  process
also is  presented.  In every  case,  the restriction  is strongly rejected.  However,  in every
case,  the yield  coefficient is less than  .25.  The average  coefficient of variation on yields
for the different commodities varies from 17.5% for irrigated soybeans to 40% for dryland
soybeans.  In five of the eight cases, the average CV is greater than 25%.
The most relevant result apparent in the empirical relationship between average yields
and the standard deviation of yields is revealed in the very low R2s presented in table  1.
The R2s reflect the strength of the relationship between average yields and the standard
deviation of yields  in terms of the percentage  of variation in the standard deviations of
yields  that is explained  by average  yields.  In every case, this relationship  is quite weak.
In six of eight cases, the R2 is below .07. This result implies that any assumed relationship
between the average and the standard deviation of yields is precarious since considerable
variation exists in the relationship between average yields and yield variation across farms.
The important  implication  of these  results is that rate-setting  practices  that examine
only average  yields likely will introduce adverse  selection into the insurance  pool  since
average  yields  are an imperfect indicator of relative  yield variability.  A likely result is
that farms having higher relative  yield variation (coefficient of variation) are more likely
to buy insurance  and will be less responsive to rate increases.  To examine this point, the
coefficient of variation on yields, average yields, and the regression relationship between
average yields and the standard deviation on yields was reevaluated for a subset of farms
for which the insurance  purchase/nonpurchase  decision was known. 9
Table 2 contains an evaluation of relative yield variation for a subsample of the data
that is divided according  to whether  insurance  was  purchased  for each crop.  The rela-
tionship between yield averages and standard deviations appears to be somewhat stronger
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Table 2.  Split  Sample  Analysis  of the Relationship  Between  Means  and Standard Deviations  of
Yields  (a, = io  + f1 ,ij)  for Kansas Farms (1981-90)
Nonpurchasers  Insurance Purchasers  Tt t-Test  of
Crop  CV  Mean  ,0  /I  CV  Mean  0  AI  Equal CVs
Dryland  29.92  33.78  5.5184  .1329  32.49  33.87  8.4832  .0684  -2.19**
Wheat  (1.9671)**  (.0577)**  (1.6575)**  (.0528)
Dryland  27.65  86.79  21.7972  .0154  33.53  91.22  25.6997  .0404  -1.78*
Corn  (6.6182)**  (.0748)  (7.7968)**  (.0837)
Dryland  33.78  61.04  14.4323  .0822  35.16  58.66  15.1186  .0778  -.73
Sorghum  (2.1327)**  (.0340)**  (2.2344)**  (.0370)**
Dryland  39.53  27.31  7.6401  .1021  41.68  24.54  8.3920  .0579  -.84
Soybeans  (1.5869)**  (.0567)*  (1.5140)**  (.0598)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Single and double asterisks (*)  indicate statistical significance
at the .10  and .05 levels, respectively.
for producers  that did not purchase  insurance  than for those that insured. The  average
yield coefficient is significant in three of four cases for nonpurchasers, but only in one of
four cases for insurance  buyers. In every case,  the coefficient of variation on yields (CV)
is higher for the farms that purchased  insurance than for the nonpurchasers.  In several
cases,  the difference  is substantial.  On average,  the mean coefficient  of variation is  3%
higher for farms that purchased insurance than for farms that did not purchase insurance.
The  statistical  significance  of this  difference  is  evaluated  using  standard  t-tests  of the
equality of means.' ° The difference is statistically significant for dryland wheat and corn.
Average yields  do not appear to differ significantly  between insurance  buyers and farms
that did not insure.
Implicit  in  any  rating  scheme  that  uses  only  the  mean  and  variance  to  determine
premium rates  is the assumption that higher ordered  moments of the yield distribution
are irrelevant (or zero). As previously noted, recent research (Gallagher; Nelson) suggests
that yield  distributions  may  be nonnormal  and  exhibit  significant  skewness.  If higher
ordered moments of the distribution are relevant,  the coefficient of variation  for yields
may not accurately reflect  loss likelihoods.
An alternative evaluation of loss risk and premium rates can be obtained by considering
the empirical  rates implied  by the yield  data.  As noted,  an actuarially sound  rate  will
equate  premiums to expected indemnities.  Thus, an empirical rate that is free of distri-
butional assumptions can be calculated from an examination of the historical yield short-
falls."  An empirical rate (bushels per acre) for coverage at the a  x  100% of the mean (a)
level of coverage is given by:
t-10
(1)  Empirical  Rate =  A  y*/N,
s=t- 1
where
*  - yield,  if yields < ag
s ~O  0otherwise,
and N is the number of nonmissing years of data. For comparison, the techniques of Botts
and Boles, which assume a normal distribution and a coefficient of variation equal to .25
(i.e.,  a = .25,t), can be used to determine FCIC-type rates. Botts and Boles  [equation (3),
p. 735]  show that, under these assumptions,  an actuarially fair rate is given by:
(2)  FCIC  Rate = b((ae - t))/.25))(at  - pt)  +  q((a-  )/  .25,).25  ,
where  D(*)  is the cumulative normal distribution function  (representing  the probability
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Table 3.  Average  Empirical Premium Rates and Rates Based  upon Normal  Distribution with CV
=  25% for  .75pz  Coverage  Level  (bu./acre):  Entire Sample  and Split Sample  Analyses  for Kansas
Farms (1981-90)
Insurance  t-Tests of
Entire Sample  Nonpurchasers  Purchasers  Equal Rates
Empirical  FCIC  Empirical  FCIC  Empirical  FCIC  Empirical  FCIC
Crop  Rate  Ratea  Rate  Ratea  Rate  Ratea  Rate  Ratea
Dryland Wheat  1.4158  .6997  1.2488  .7035  1.5629  .7054  -2.61**  -.14
(.9663)  (.1075)  (.8774)  (.0958)  (.9686)  (.1151)
Dryland Corn  4.0887  1.8315  2.8590  1.8079  4.3478  1.9000  -2.09**  -1.52
(2.2954)  (.3089)  (2.0034)  (.3596)  (1.9008)  (.4033)
Dryland Sorghum  2.6314  1.3038  2.6597  1.2714  2.7628  1.2218  -.42  1.03
(1.6708)  (.3181)  (1.6425)  (.3056)  (1.4990)  (.3027)
Dryland Soybeans  1.6322  .5277  1.6926  .5689  1.6214  .5112  .39  1.94*
(.7506)  (.1209)  (.8145)  (.1265)  (.7716)  (.1301)
Notes: Entire  sample  refers to larger sample of 2,247  farms,  while split sample  analysis  is conducted  for 572
farms for which insurance  purchase  decisions are known. Numbers in parentheses  are standard errors.  Single
and double asterisks (*) indicate statistical significance at the .10  and .05 levels,  respectively.
a FCIC rates are calculated using the technique described by Botts and Boles, assuming normality and a = .25t.
that  a yield  less than  aui  will be observed)  and  0(-)  is the unit normal density function
(representing the ordinate  of the normal distribution at art).
Table  3 contains  empirical rates and FCIC-type rates calculated  from Botts and Boles'
formulas for the  75%  yield election  level.  Rates  are presented  for the entire  sample  of
farms as well  as the  subsamples  for which  crop  insurance  purchases  were  known.  For
dryland  wheat,  corn,  and  sorghum,  the  empirical  rates  are  significantly greater  for the
farms that purchased  crop insurance.  Confirming  the results  for yield CVs, the average
differences  are shown to be  statistically significant  using t-tests of the equality of means
for wheat and corn.  The largest  difference  occurs for corn,  where the average empirical
rate for purchasers is over 50% higher than that for nonpurchasers. The FCIC rates, based
entirely upon yield averages, are very similar for buyers and nonbuyers of crop insurance.
This reflects  the fact that average yields  are quite  similar for insurance purchasers  and
nonpurchasers.  The FCIC-based rates are significantly below the empirical rates in every
case, perhaps reflecting the fact that yield CVs for these four crops are above 25%.
Because of the small number of years used to calculate the empirical rates, several farms
had empirical rates of zero for the 75% yield election.  Thus, some downward bias in the
empirical rates might be expected and the differences between FCIC rates and the empirical
rates might be even greater if more historical data were available.  In all, the examination
of empirical  rates confirms  the differences  noted above  for yield CVs  and suggests  that
insurance  purchasers  have  greater yield variation  than nonpurchasers.  Empirical  rates
also are found to be significantly  above FCIC-type rates in every  case.
In all, the actuarial practices  that are currently used to determine  crop insurance  pre-
mium  rates may  induce  adverse  selection  by encouraging  participation  by  higher risk
farms.  A key assumption  that may be questionable  is the sole use  of average  yields  to
determine  expected  loss risk and premiums  for individual  farms.  An empirical  exami-
nation of the relationship between yield variation (standard deviations)  and mean yields
revealed that any assumption  regarding the nature of this relationship would be insup-
portable since there is considerable  variation in the nature of this relationship from farm
to farm. The insurance market is likely to be drawn from one extreme of this distribution
since those individuals have a greater return to insurance under given premium schedules.
In the context of these results, it is also essential to acknowledge that the FCIC often
must  determine  rates  for individual  farms with no  (or very limited)  knowledge  of the
farms' yield histories.  Calculation of means and relative  variation of yields to determine
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expected  loss risk  is  difficult  or even  impossible  in this  case.  Farms that often  collect
indemnities may even drop in and out of the program to prevent developing a yield history
that would result in their paying high rates.12 In the case of farms with insufficient yield
histories upon which to base an estimate of relative  yield variation,  a high expected risk
level  should be assigned. To  some extent, the FCIC does apply such a penalty by using
transition yields (t-yields) which determine rates and insurable yields by using a proportion
of ASCS program yield data.
Prediction of Relative  Yield  Variation
Given the tenuous nature of the relationship between yield averages and standard devi-
ations,  a relevant  question is whether  observable  farm characteristics  could be used to
improve measurement of yield risk in rating insurance. Private insurance contractors (e.g.,
property, life, and health insurance providers) typically use observable factors which are
correlated with  risk to assign  premium  rates.  A number of observable farm  operation
characteristics were collected from the Kansas data and used in conjunction with the yield
histories to evaluate factors that might be useful in improving estimates of the likelihood
of yield  shortfalls.  In addition to average yields  (u),  these  factors include the size of the
enterprise (ACRES), size squared (ACRES 2), the percent  of the operation that is rented
(% RENTED), net farm income (INCOME), total crop acres (CROP ACRES),  fertilizer
and chemical  expenditures  per crop acre  (CHEM & FERT), a Herfindahl  index  of di-
versification  calculated from  sales shares (DIVERSIFICATION), leverage  (DEBTS/AS-
SETS), government  payment receipts per crop acre  (GOVT PMTS), the percent of total
farm  acres  engaged  in  crop  production  (% CROP ACRES), the  percent  of total  sales
represented by crops (% CROP SALES), dummy variables representing  corporate enter-
prises (CORPORATION)  and partnerships  (PARTNERSHIP), and a series  of regional
dummy variables that distinguish six different geographic regions of Kansas. Coefficients
of variation for each  of the eight different  crop  enterprises were  regressed  against these
variables. Average  values  of the observable farm characteristics  over the  1981  through
1990 period are used in the regressions. The results are presented in table 4.
Average yields are inversely correlated with relative yield variation in every case. This
relationship is highly significant for every crop. Significant  size effects are also  revealed
for the dryland enterprises. For wheat, grain sorghum, and soybeans, relative  yield vari-
ation falls at a decreasing rate as enterprise size increases. Conversely, a significant positive
relationship between  size and relative  yield variability is revealed for dryland corn. The
implied size effects  for dryland commodities  are illustrated  in figure  2.  It is relevant  to
note that the statistical significance  of the corn  effect is lower than that found for other
commodities. No  significant  relationship between  size and  yield  variability is  revealed
for the irrigated crops.
The proportion of the enterprise that is produced on rented land is negatively correlated
with yield variability  in every  case, though  this effect  is statistically significant  only for
dryland corn and soybeans and irrigated wheat. Total crop farm size, as measured by total
crop acres, is negatively related to yield variation for dryland corn and positively related
to  yield variation  for irrigated  wheat. This  effect  is  not statistically  significant  for the
remaining enterprises.
Income,  chemical and  fertilizer expenditures,  leverage, and  government  payment re-
ceipts are not significantly related to relative yield variation. Diversification  is negatively
correlated with yield variability for irrigated grain sorghum, but is not significant for the
remaining commodities.  The proportion  of total acres engaged in crop  production was
included  to represent  overall  land quality.  Farms with lower  land quality  are  likely to
have more  waste and set-aside. This variable is significant only in the dryland sorghum
equation, where,  counter  to expectations,  it is  positively correlated  with relative  yield
variation. The proportion  of total sales that comes  from crops is significantly related to
yield variability for dryland soybeans, but is not significant in any other equation. Cor-
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Figure 2.  Relative yield variation and size
porate dryland wheat farms have significantly more yield variation than do sole-proprietor
enterprises.  However,  no significant  difference  in yield variability  among different  farm
enterprise organizations is detected for the other commodities. Finally, a series of regional
dummy variables confirm that significant regional differences  exist in relative yield vari-
ation. This provides support for the FCIC's practice  of determining rates for individual
counties.
The  R2s of the  equations  are  considerably  larger  than  those  revealed  in  preceding
analyses, indicating that information  other than average yields could be used to improve
predictions of yield variability. The important implication is that these factors may provide
useful insights  into expected  losses in  situations  where yield histories  are  unavailable.
However, the basic point remains that the relationship between yield variation and average
yields and other observable factors is quite limited and thus yield histories should be used
directly when available to calculate measures  of variation that directly measure risk.
In all, these results  provide a degree of support for current FCIC  practices that apply
discounts  for farms with higher  average  yields.  However,  even in the best of cases,  this
relationship  is imperfect,  and thus basing  risk measures  solely on averages may induce
adverse  selection.  Actuarial practices would likely benefit from directly measuring yield
variability  to assign expected risk.
Summary and Concluding  Remarks
This study reviews the actuarial practices currently used by the Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation to determine  premium  rates  for multiple  peril crop  insurance. The  role of
adverse selection, which occurs when rates do not accurately represent the true likelihood
of losses, is discussed.  The FCIC's  emphasis on average  yields as an indicator  of yield
variability is evaluated using data drawn  from 2,247 Kansas crop farms.
Goodwin
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The  results indicate  that averages are  indeed inversely  correlated  with relative yield
variation.  However,  the results  also indicate that this relationship  is tenuous,  and  that
rates that depend heavily on average yields may imperfectly represent loss probabilities
and thus cause adverse selection. A superior solution would be to directly use yield histories
to measure  variation rather  than just expected  yields.  Relative  yield variability,  repre-
sented  by the  coefficient  of variation  of yields,  offers  a  suitable  metric  for measuring
expected loss risk.
The  FCIC  often  is  constrained  to  working  with  a  small  number of previous  yield
observations  (perhaps even zero) when attempting  to assign individual  producers rates.
In such cases, an examination  of alternative  observable farm factors,  including size vari-
ables, tenure, and diversification  may be useful. Significant  scale effects  are revealed  for
dryland crops.
[Received November 1993; final revision received  May 1994.]
Notes
' Between  1980  and  1990,  the average  participation  rate  in the federal  crop insurance  program  was about
17% of eligible acres (U.S. General Accounting Office  1992).
2 An actuarially fair premium  is one which equates premiums to expected indemnities.  With actuarially fair
premiums, expected loss ratios (the ratio of indemnities paid out to premiums collected) are one.
3 Material in this section is based upon personal communications with the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation.
4 The loss cost ratio  is given by the ratio of indemnity outlays to total liability.
5 The NASS dataset used to determine rates is updated rather infrequently. In some cases,  a lag of five years
may occur before  yields are updated.
6 Skees  and Reed examined yield histories drawn from  four samples of 54,  54,  48, and 65 farms  in Illinois
and Kentucky.
7 For  convenience,  a normal  yield  distribution  is illustrated.  However,  considerable  evidence  (Gallagher;
Nelson)  suggests that significant  skewness may exist in yield distributions.  Allowing skewness  may exaggerate
the effects described here.  This point also is made in other research,  including Just and Calvin and U.S. General
Accounting  Office (1993).
8 Farms missing more than a single year of data were excluded from the analysis.
9 Of the 2,247  farms  in the sample,  information regarding  insurance  purchases was  known  for  572 farms.
Irrigated crops were excluded from this portion of the analysis because of very small samples.
10  The t-tests allow for differences in standard deviations in constructing the t-statistics.
" A limitation of using empirical rates to examine loss risk is that relatively large samples may be needed to
accurately measure risk. For example, with only 10 years of data, one may not observe yields below the proportion
of the mean  of interest (e.g.,  65%), implying  an empirical  premium rate  of zero. However, the probability of
loss is likely to be greater than zero for any realistic yield election.
12 Farms can "lose" their yield history by dropping coverage for a year, after which they assume ASCS transition
yields.  In addition,  farms also have been able to lose their yield histories by changing insurance companies  or
transferring  insurance  among operators, although improved record keeping is eliminating such practices.
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